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CHAPTER 11 
Framing Network Style Interactions 
in Local Governance: 
Three Narratives 
By Gary S. Marshall, with Eric Buske 
Networks are the medium through which we exchange information, re-
sources and influence with each other; they have momentous consequences 
on our lives. They enable us to transcend individual limitations by joining 
with others to solve common problems and develop innovations. Conversely, 
networks make us more vulnerable to intended and unintended actions of 
others; they can amplify, distort, and accelerate the consequences of our in-
teractions, thus making the world far more uncertain and dangerous (Cum-
mings as cited in Chisholm, p. xvii). 
Chapter 11. Framing Network Style Interactions in Local Governance 
Introduction 
Since the mid 1990's there has been a proliferation of writing about the 
network model of organization. This reflects the broader dynamic of the 
shift within the public sector from questions of government to govern-
ance of which networks are a central organizing mechanism. Networks, 
proponents claim, are more effective than single organizations because 
they require public and private organizations to coordinate and integrate 
the funding, service delivery, and regulatory processes (Scott 1985; Pro-
van & Milward 1995). As a result, fragmentation and duplication of ser-
vices are assumed to decrease, while client outcomes are thought to in-
crease through improved accessibility and continuity of service delivery 
(Rosenheck et al. 1998).  
 In the U.S., public management research has increasingly focused on 
the study of networks as a central research theme. In doing so, it has 
sought to use the study of networks as a means to maintain a tradition of 
positivist research (Dubnick 1999; Agranoff & McGuire 2001). To this end, 
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networks have been understood as new instruments of organizational ra-
tionality. The instrumental focus will likely remain central to public man-
agement network research in the U.S. (Berry et al. 2004). In contrast, the 
European tradition (Bogason 2000, 2005; Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1997; 
Sørensen & Torfing 2005) sees a discussion of both social theory and de-
mocratic theory as integral to a comprehensive framework of democratic 
network governance.  
 Peter Bogason’s work is of particular importance on this point. His 
analysis of institutional change to Danish local government and the im-
plications of these changes for democratic governance give a crucial 
roadmap for operating within what he calls ‘new forms of fragmentation’ 
(2005: 23) or the administrative ‘gray zone’ (Sørensen 2002). Effective ad-
ministrative action requires steering among and between the state, the 
market and civil society. Hence a problem arises in theorizing about how 
to manage effectively and democratically within such a fluid context. 
Bogason notes that traditional aggregative and integrative theories of 
democracy and newer deliberative theories of democracy are all predi-
cated upon clear distinctions between state, the market and civil society. 
He suggests that: 
These [sectoral barriers] are difficult to maintain as separate spheres of 
contemporary society. So instead of taking this relatively static analytical 
position, we may have to understand how democracy is constructed and re-
constructed, not as a process of maintaining some popular sovereignty but 
as processes of solving local problems requiring some type of collaborative 
activity ... At the local level, then, we must identify problematics that require 
collective action in some form, and ask ourselves how procedures for such 
action are established and maintained, how resources are allocated, and 
how positions are formed and filled. This is an approach within institutional 
analysis but without a presupposition that any particular value of (liberal) 
politics, local solidarity of civil society, or market forces must have prece-
dence over the other (Bogason 2005: 36). 
Bogason’s insight here is crucial. That is, new forms of governance – al-
beit fragmented – must be democratic and must be workable. Such a per-
spective is doubly important for the American context with its overt in-
strumental and technicist orientation. In effect, what Bogason suggests is 
to tackle the problem inductively. That is, in post welfare state public ad-
ministration one must ask: What is the type of problem to be solved? 
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What is the framework for collective practice? How can the practice re-
main democratic? 
Empirical Applications: The Omaha Cases 
In support of such a logic of inquiry, we have employed a qualitative re-
search approach, conducting interviews with eight public administrators. 
The interview questions addressed five general areas of administrative 
practice: (1) administrative function: formal and informal; (2) organiza-
tional structure and organizational practices; (3) conflicts and contradic-
tions experienced in the completion of workplace responsibilities; (4) cop-
ing strategies for resolving conflicts and contradictions; and (5) resource 
allocation and democratic accountability. The theoretical framework 
guiding our research accepts Bogason’s premise that the broad rubric of 
institutional analysis can be helpful in assessing dynamic conditions at 
the local level to determine the unique collective arrangements that are 
manifest. 
 In this chapter, an analysis of three of the eight interviews is presented. 
Rather than use the term case, the term narrative is used forthwith. Re-
searchers often use the phrase ‘case narrative’ (Flyvbjerg 2001) and it is in 
this tradition that we employ the term narrative. By narrative, we refer to 
the detailing of a series of events that reflect the complexities and contra-
dictions of real life (Flyvbjerg 2001: 84). What follows are three narratives 
of administrators who have, as a result of shifts in public administrative 
practices, found themselves moving, to varying degrees, from traditional 
governmental organizing frameworks, to network governance style set-
tings.  
 The narratives presented reflect the changes occurring in Omaha, Ne-
braska, USA, a municipal region of approximately 350,000 citizens, as its 
public administrative structures move from government to governance. 
Three law enforcement administrators are profiled: Joe, Don and Mike. 
The profiles follow the approach developed by Sørensen (2002) in a major 
Danish study on administrative reform in the municipality of Skander-
borg. In her Skanderborg study, Sørensen demonstrated how new forms 
of governance create role tensions for administrators and new dilemmas 
for democratic practice. Below are the three Omaha narratives, followed 
by a more detailed analysis. 
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Case #1 Joe 
Joe is the Law Enforcement and Community Coordinator for the United 
States Attorney’s office in Omaha. He has been in his position at the U.S. 
Attorney’s office for the past 15 years. Joe answers directly to the United 
States Attorney (USA) in Nebraska. 
 When Joe was first hired 15 years ago, his title was just Law Enforce-
ment Coordinator. The name change is indicative of an evolution in De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) strategy over the past 15 years. The position 
originated with Joe and initially involved the oversight of the disburse-
ment of DOJ dollars to local law enforcement agencies. The move since 
then has been towards more community-based prevention and outreach 
programs.  
 Today Joe specifically coordinates law enforcement agencies and com-
munity groups in the implementation of DOJ programs dealing with ter-
rorism, gun violence, and youth outreach. A portion of Joe’s coordination 
duties consists of forming and directing steering committees. These steer-
ing committees are utilized by the USA’s office to determine how DOJ’s 
funds are spent. The steering committees are usually a mix of community 
members, law enforcement, academics and Crime Commission members.  
 There are DOJ guidelines that mandate a certain percentage of funding 
go to law enforcement and a certain percentage to community outreach. 
Beyond these guidelines, there is tremendous amount discretion how the 
monies are distributed and which strategies are funded. The allocation of 
the funds is important beyond simple fiscal decisions. There are usually 
several hundred thousand dollars at stake with considerable discretion in 
how they are allocated. How the money is meted out endorses and gives 
life to the programs it funds, and often kills programs that are not funded.  
 In addition, Joe represents the USA’s office in community outreach 
programs. The focus of these programs is youth violence prevention. The 
USA’s office arranges intervention meetings with known youthful gang 
members and other troubled youth. Joe also works within the community 
on Victim Impact statements. These statements are solicited from 
neighborhoods that have been impacted by gang activity or drug dealing. 
None of these programs existed when Joe started 15 years ago. 
 Joe’s network consists of local and federal law enforcement agencies, 
non-profit organizations (such as the Girl Scouts, the Chicano Awareness 
Center, and others), and community members. Conflict arises within the 
network when there is competition for funds. This conflict is usually be-
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tween various community groups or non-profits that want to fund their 
programs. There is also occasional conflict between the law enforcement 
agencies vying for the same dollars. To a lesser extent, there is conflict at 
times (over dollars or strategies) between the law enforcement agencies 
and the community groups.  
 Joe copes with the funding and strategy conflicts that arise within his 
network through compromise, debate, and a determination on how or-
ganized and how prepared the submitting group or non-profit is. The ul-
timate decision is often made through consensus, with the process being 
led by Joe. On the rare occasion that conflict can not be resolved through 
the above measures, Joe has to fall into the role of a classic public admin-
istrator and use his authority (as an agent of the U.S. Attorney) and dic-
tate the resolution.  
 The determination of who participates in Joe’s network generally de-
pends on the nature of the project being worked on. Joe acknowledges 
that many of the same community members (particularly those that are 
unaffiliated with formal organizations) serve on steering committees re-
peatedly. This appears to be a combination of initial citizen interest and 
then ‘learning the ropes’ of the participatory process. The same is true of 
certain non-profit organizations. Repeated service and familiarity result 
in community members and organizations being invited back when a 
new program or funds are initiated. This appears to lead to a situation 
where the same circle of people represents the ‘community’ in many of 
the decision making processes. From Joe’s perspective this creates an effi-
cient system because of the institutional knowledge within the network. 
Case #2: Don 
Don is a police detective who works in the Domestic Violence Unit. He 
has been with the Omaha Police Department (OPD) for about twenty 
years and has worked in the Domestic Violence Unit since its inception 
seven years ago. The Domestic Violence Unit investigates crimes involv-
ing assaults between parties involved in relationships. It also investigates 
other crimes involving persons in relationships such as vandalism, 
threats, or stalking. The Unit is co-housed with the County and City Vic-
tim/Witness groups (non-profit advocacy groups for victims of domestic 
crimes). Although a component of the OPD, the development of the Do-
mestic Violence Unit grew from a network formed to address the grow-
ing (or at least more publicly visible) problem of domestic violence in the 
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city. The network that tries to address domestic violence and provided 
the impetus for this unit is the Domestic Violence Coordinating Council 
(DVCC). The DVCC is made up of the OPD, County Attorney’s Office, 
the YWCA, Catholic Charities, the Courts, and others interested in the 
problem of domestic violence. The DVCC meets on a monthly basis and 
helps provide a united strategy for dealing with domestic violence in the 
city.  
 The concept of the DVCC and the Domestic Violence Unit reflects a 
significant shift away from the way things had always been done. Twenty 
years ago the police department only dealt with the most severe cases of 
domestic violence. As the problem came into the public consciousness the 
OPD began to pursue newer approaches such as victimless prosecution 
(domestic violence victims frequently refuse to cooperate with prosecu-
tion). However the OPD and the other groups continued to work in un-
coordinated isolation. Prior to the DVCC and the Domestic Violence Unit 
the OPD split domestic violence investigation between investigative units 
by crime types (assaults investigated by Homicide, vandalism by Bur-
glary, etc.). 
 Don is a line worker in the network that includes the Domestic Vio-
lence Unit. His role as a public administrator has changed since the de-
velopment of this network primarily by the ‘case sharing’ that occurs. 
Prior to the establishment of the Domestic Violence Unit, Don worked his 
cases by himself with little or no communication with advocacy groups 
such as the YWCA. Don would work his case until he felt he had enough 
to make an arrest, presented it through the ‘system’ for prosecution, and 
been done with it. In today’s network environment, Don may have con-
tact during the course of his investigation with an advocate from the 
YWCA or Catholic Charities, and the prosecutors from the County Attor-
ney’s Office. Don also knows the Court is willing to hear a victimless do-
mestic violence prosecution (where the victim refuses to cooperate). A 
victim of domestic violence will have the opportunity to have their case 
referred to a counseling group from the very first stages of the investiga-
tion. 
 Don receives his cases (the victims he serves) primarily through Police 
crime reports. However he also does get some referrals through some of 
the advocacy groups he works with. Don’s caseload is very heavy and he 
can receive 30 to 50 new cases a month. 
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 Conflict within the network for Don is routine and happens fre-
quently. The conflict, in Don’s view, typically stems from expectations of 
the members of the network who are primarily in an advocacy role. When 
this kind of conflict occurs, over a well known case in the community for 
example, Don finds that he resorts to the norms of the police profession in 
his responses. Such a circumstance, in fact, enacts the shadow of hierar-
chy, to which we referred earlier. 
 Don’s coping mechanisms are usually communication and explana-
tion.  
 The communication occurs in an informal manner via the telephone or 
in person. Usually it involves a legal explanation or Don sharing his past 
experience with a particular victim (in seven years Don has had many of 
the same victims). When communication or explanation between Don 
and his peers in other network agencies does not resolve the conflict, it 
becomes the responsibility of Don’s superiors to take the conflict to the 
broader DVCC. 
Case #3: Mike 
Mike directed the Child/Victim Sex Unit for five and one half years, and 
was integral to the establishment of Project Harmony. Project Harmony is 
a community based network which includes Project Harmony staff, the 
Omaha Police Department, the County Attorney’s Office, Child Protec-
tive Services (CPS), and an extensive array of non-profit service provid-
ers. The mission of the Project Harmony is ‘to protect children by provid-
ing community-based, integrated, comprehensive and coordinated child 
abuse assessment and investigation in a centralized location’ 
(www.projectharmony.com). Because, Mike worked as a detective in the 
Youth Services Unit (the predecessor of Project Harmony) for three and 
one half years, he has a unique perspective. 
 Mike sees the formation of Project Harmony as a ‘change in philoso-
phy’ in the handling of child abuse cases. Prior to Project Harmony, a vic-
tim of child abuse would encounter a level of bureaucratic inertia, often 
having to explain over and over, the circumstance of the abuse event(s). 
Under Project Harmony, many of the agencies, including the police are 
co-located in one building. This decreases the administrative burden on 
the part of the victim and related parties.  
 Mike has a significant leadership role in this network and his role 
change as a public administrator is significant under the network model. 
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In a classic police administrator role, the Unit Commander directs the ac-
tivities of the detectives under his or her command. This includes case 
management and a classic hierarchical paramilitary command structure. 
Under the network model Mike has similar management responsibilities 
but case decisions are often made in a consensus environment. He says 
the biggest difference because of the network is the communication and 
sharing of resources that exist across the network. He notes: ‘The strength 
of the network is that there are various agencies providing their services 
under one roof.’  
  This is also the source of much of the conflict. While these various 
agencies all have the welfare of children as their primary mission, there 
are different philosophies as to how to best achieve child welfare. OPD 
serves as an investigating agency that takes enforcement action when the 
case allows it to. OPD also makes decisions regarding the placement of 
abused children with agencies such as the Child Protective Service. Hos-
pitals operate with varying degrees of advocacy depending on the train-
ing and philosophy of the staff. Other organizations believe the education 
is the correct route to take in dealing with abuse situations. Most conflict 
arises in cases where there is ambiguity about the circumstances of the 
abuse event. In clear abuse cases there is usually little conflict. 
 Mike’s first coping mechanism was communication between the agen-
cies. They had monthly meetings where the managers of the Project Har-
mony agencies meet to discuss cases. These meetings would involve the 
review of critical cases from the previous month. If there had been dis-
agreement it was often resolved then. These administrators also worked 
to make sure their various policies did not conflict with each other or the 
mission of the network. On a day to day level, line workers within the 
network dealt with much of the conflict. Usually conflict did not come to 
Mike’s level day to day unless there had been failure at the lower levels.  
 The second coping mechanism was the formation of alliances within 
the network according to philosophy. These alliances would affect day to 
day decisions and decisions at the network board level. The dangers of 
alliances within the network are obviously the threat to the network and 
‘group think’ within the alliance (defeating the purpose of the network). 
 The other conflict Mike had within his job as commander of the Child 
Victim/Sex Unit was between his role in Project Harmony and his role in 
the Domestic Violence Coordinating Council (discussed in Don’s inter-
view above). This conflict arose because the philosophies of the two net-
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works were different. Both networks operated under the philosophy of 
combining services for victims. DVCC’s focus was on the mother and vio-
lence she faced. Project Harmony’s focus was on the children. The differ-
ence is that Project Harmony advocates the removal of children and the 
prosecution of mothers if the evidence supports it, even if she is also a vic-
tim. DVCC tends to view the mother primarily as another victim and ad-
vocates keeping the family in tact if it is best for the mother. In addition to 
a difference in philosophies, both groups compete for the same grant dol-
lars. Mike’s coping with this conflict family consisted of trying to balance 
the OPD’s approach to both networks.  
 Mike dealt with any conflict he felt between his role in these networks 
and his role in the OPD by keeping communication open between himself 
and his Captain and would seek guidance when there was conflict. Mike 
also enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy in his commander role 
so conflict was kept to a minimum.  
Framing the Organizing Style of the Three Narratives 
The narratives above have some commonalities and some distinct ele-
ments to them. In terms of institutional design, all three cases depict hori-
zontal coordination among relatively autonomous entities that have been 
purposively brought together. And, even though these three cases are 
called network structures by their participants, they have most of the 
characteristics found in so-called horizontal self-coordinating entities 
(Scharpf 1994). Having acknowledged this point, these cases might be 
placed in different points along a spectrum between operating in the 
shadow of hierarchy on the one hand, as in the case of Joe with the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office, and operating in a strongly interconnected fashion, on 
the other, as in the case of Mike with Project Harmony.  
 In the following section we offer two levels of analysis. First, we pro-
pose an organizing framework for each of the three narratives. We draw 
upon the work of Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (1997: 181-88) to do so. 
Second, to further clarify the differences between the frameworks, and 
provide an opportunity to analyze the organizational dynamics of each, 
the analysis is organized according to three key elements of democratic 
practice: implementation, mediation, and participation. 
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Joe, the Instrumentalist 
Joe relies heavily on the resources and authority he has at his disposal. In 
that regard, the special role of government is readily employed by him in 
his interactions. Thus in the range of committees, commissions and or-
ganizational configurations with which he is involved, the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, with Joe as its representative, often acts as a principal with other 
entities serving as agents in a subordinate role. Given this particular con-
stellation, one can analyze Joe’s situation using three elements: implemen-
tation, mediation, and participation. 
 Joe’s approach to implementation is instrumentalist. That is, it main-
tains ‘the fundamental assumption of one ‘steering’ actor who exercises 
goal-oriented influence on other actors – target groups’ (Kickert, Klijn & 
Koppenjan 1997: 183). The primary steering mechanism used is funding 
and it is very effective. As pointed out in the narrative, programs and in 
many cases the non-profit entity that delivers it, live or die based on fund-
ing decisions by Joe’s office. Mediation between entities is grounded 
mostly in compromise with, in extreme cases, Joe asserting the ultimate 
authority of his agency. Lastly, participation is democratic but in many 
ways it is pro forma. The dynamic of the so-called professional citizen is 
evident. Joe, perhaps not maliciously, but certainly with some intentional-
ity, limits the entry of unknown actors and as such limits democratic par-
ticipation. 
 Joe has adapted to the decentralized, multi-sectoral service delivery 
environment without the yielding power and authority tied to his agency. 
In his view, he remains a steward of the public interest and holds himself 
and his agency accountable in a way that is consistent with the aggrega-
tive view of democratic administrative practice. He does so through a 
strategy by which a principal government entity chooses to engage with 
public, private and non-profit partners. It is a cooperative venture but it is 
not by definition a network wherein that each entity within the network 
cannot survive with out the link to the other entities. While this approach 
creates more goal-directed behaviour it has its pitfalls. As Kickert, Klijn 
and Koppenjan point out ‘not enough attention is given to the interests 
and goals of others, which can result in the deterioration of relations be-
tween actors and the loss of commitment to a collective approach to prob-
lem solving’ (1997: 184). In addition, it defies the broad critique of gov-
ernment which brought on the governance phenomenon. Namely, the 
need for a collaborative process for arriving at the public interest and fur-
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ther, an awareness of the interdependence among service delivery enti-
ties, despite power inequities.  
Don, the Interactionist 
If we consider the same three elements: implementation, mediation and 
participation, Don, the detective in the domestic violence unit, has a dif-
ferent profile than Joe. In terms of implementation he is more interaction-
ist than instrumental is his efforts. Although still part of a traditional gov-
ernment agency, the OPD, his unit was deliberately embedded in a con-
stellation of other organizations all working on behalf of a common goal. 
As a result, we have not a focal organization as was the case with Joe and 
U.S. Attorney’s Office, but a series of organizations interacting with one 
another, exercising mutual influence, with the intention of collectively re-
ducing domestic violence. 
 As reported in the case, major blockages recur due to divergent organ-
izational cultures. Successful implementation can only occur if adjust-
ments are made among the actors within the DVCC. Mediation of conflict 
then is central to effective collective action. Conflict reduction in this envi-
ronment is hampered by divergences in organizational identity and or-
ganizational practices. Don describes this dynamic as faulty communica-
tion and strives to improve communication between organizations within 
the DVCC. The DVCC although not truly a network, is horizontally based 
and is defined by a lack of hierarchy. In such a space, the type of media-
tion required is a brokering of interests as there is no overriding institu-
tional framework that might dictate a different form of mediation. How-
ever, such forms of mediation do not address fundamental differences in 
orientation. Don, for example, reports his frustration with the ‘advocacy’ 
orientation of some organizations within the DVCC. Other organizations 
might object to the ‘lock’em up’ orientation of the police department 
which impedes a family systems approach to dealing with domestic vio-
lence issues. 
 Participation reflects a dynamic pluralism wherein the groups in-
volved may not all share the same orientation toward the problem of do-
mestic violence, but are willing to interact through brokering and mutual 
adjustment. Hence, as opposed to Case #1, participation is expected, ac-
cepted and is understood by all to be central to a successful outcome. In-
novative practices have also influenced participation. As Don noted, in 
situations where a victim of domestic violence is afraid of testifying for 
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fear of reprisal, prosecution of a case may still move ahead. The role of the 
courts is also a dimension for consideration. A decision by the courts, viz., 
the willingness to hear victimless cases, can either aid or deter participa-
tion. Hence a consideration in this case is the hidden power of the courts 
in a seemingly horizontal configuration of actors with equal capacity for 
mutual adjustment. 
Mike, the Institutionalist 
The third narrative is of Mike, the senior law enforcement official who 
works on cases of child abuse for the Omaha Police Department as part of 
Project Harmony. Project Harmony comes closest to a network in the full 
sense of the definition (Sørensen & Torfing 2003). Further, the network 
was initiated not by a government entity, but by a well known actor 
within the policy community who in ‘bottom- up’ fashion brought to-
gether other actors and formed a network with the common objective of 
addressing the issue of child abuse. Reflecting once again upon the ele-
ments of implementation, mediation and participation, it is evident that 
Project Harmony is more of a social institution in its own right. The 
strength of an institutionalist orientation is that is that when it comes to 
implementation, it is neither overly purposive, nor indifferent to the un-
derlying social bond that holds a social institution together. As a result, 
the subtleties of solving cases of child abuse do not get lost the bureau-
cratic machinery of the instrumentalist perspective, nor in the bargaining 
mentality of the interactionist perspective. 
 As Mike noted, prior to the establishment of Project Harmony, victims 
of child abuse were often shuffled from agency to agency all the while 
obliged to retell the circumstances of their case time and again. Such a 
framework embarrassed the victims, albeit unintentionally, led to mis-
takes in processing and case prosecution and increased infighting among 
relevant agencies. Since the establishment of Project Harmony, Mike’s 
role has changed. The expectations for him to act in the narrow interest of 
the OPD have diminished and the incentives for him to act in coordina-
tion with other institutional partners have increased. It is clear that those 
incentives are the result of socially constructed norms and arrangements 
rather than means-end operating agreements or interest based brokered 
relationships.  
 The institutionalist dynamic is evident in the approach to mediating 
conflict and communication among members of Project Harmony. Like, 
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the previous narrative, there are also divergences in organizational cul-
ture among organizations. However, there is a social glue, perhaps as a 
result of the appreciation of the social capital implicit within the network, 
that casts a more facilitative ethos to the mediation of differences within 
Project Harmony. Hence, rather than there being a contest of wills be-
tween the advocacy types and the law enforcement types, Mike’s narra-
tive suggests that there each sees the possibility of learning from the 
other. While debates may remain, the fact that Project Harmony is a social 
institution creates a different kind of bond among members. 
 When framing participation in this case, it is important to consider the 
previous level of infighting among agencies regarding cases of child 
abuse. Such infighting was primarily the result of fears about accountabil-
ity and concern for protection of the victim which often had the unin-
tended effect of isolating relevant agencies from one another. Hence par-
ticipation in this case is concerned with shared practices and valuing the 
victim of abuse in a more authentic, sensitive and less paternalistic man-
ner. In this regard participation is most successful when trust occurs 
within the network. Such trust leads to innovative practices and openness 
in dialogue and deliberation about the child abuse cases. 
Conclusion: Adding it all Together 
The aim of this chapter is to point the way toward a more robust view of 
network organizing in the U.S. context. We began by establishing the 
predominance of the instrumental view within the U.S. public manage-
ment literature. It is argued that U.S. researchers can learn from the Euro-
pean tradition which sees administrative practice and democratic practice 
as interwoven as democratic network governance. 
 Using the work of Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, we were able to name 
the different strategies underlying each of the Omaha narratives. Consis-
tent with the work of Sørensen and Torfing, were able to elucidate the 
conflicts and coping strategies that administrators use to deal with the 
new institutional frameworks in which they find themselves. Finally, fol-
lowing Bogason’s insights, we can consider the further ways of organiz-
ing that are democratic and that reflect on the specifics of collective action 
at the local level. 
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